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Abstract
Previous studies showed that the understanding of others’ basic emotional experiences is based on a ‘‘resonant’’
mechanism, i.e., on the reactivation, in the observer’s brain, of the cerebral areas associated with those experiences. The
present study aimed to investigate whether the same neural mechanism is activated both when experiencing and attending
complex, cognitively-generated, emotions. A gambling task and functional-Magnetic-Resonance-Imaging (fMRI) were used
to test this hypothesis using regret, the negative cognitively-based emotion resulting from an unfavorable counterfactual
comparison between the outcomes of chosen and discarded options. Do the same brain structures that mediate the
experience of regret become active in the observation of situations eliciting regret in another individual? Here we show that
observing the regretful outcomes of someone else’s choices activates the same regions that are activated during a first-
person experience of regret, i.e. the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and hippocampus. These
results extend the possible role of a mirror-like mechanism beyond basic emotions.
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Introduction
From the early stages of cognitive development, humans are
able to represent and understand others’ mental and emotional
states [1]. It has been suggested that the neural bases of this ability
may rely on the mirror mechanism [2,3]. The mirror mechanism
has been investigated in two major domains, i.e. sensorimotor and
emotional, involving two main circuits. One is located on the
lateral convexity of the cortex, and includes the inferior parietal
lobule (IPL) and the ventral premotor cortex plus the caudal part
of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). This circuit mediates the
understanding of gestures and meaningful actions [2,3]. The
second circuit, which includes the insula and anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), is involved in the experiential understanding of
others’ emotional states shaping interpersonal relations at a basic
level [4–7].
Although there may be several ways in which others’ emotions
can be understood, recent studies indicate that one such
mechanism is based on the reactivation of the cerebral areas
associated with the observer’s direct emotional experience [6]. Yet,
neural mirror-responses have been assessed only in conditions
involving basic-level emotional stimuli, such as visual expressions
of disgust [5] or cues signaling pain [7]. As far as complex
emotions are concerned, to date there is only behavioral evidence
to suggest the involvement of a mirror-like mechanism in the
automatic understanding of others’ emotional states [8,9].
To further advance our understanding of complex emotional
processes, the present study investigates whether the understand-
ing of others’ negative emotions involves the activation of the same
neural mechanism as in the first-person experience. Specifically,
we investigated whether a neural resonance system is also engaged
in situations involving complex emotions that emerge at the
interface with high-level cognitive processing. To this purpose we
used regret, a cognitively-based emotion that occurs when one’s
outcome is worse than the outcome one would have obtained had
one made a different choice. Unlike basic emotions, regret stems
from the counterfactual comparison between alternative out-
comes, as when the chosen option in a gamble results in a negative
outcome compared with that of the unselected alternative [10]. The
possibility to quantify and evaluate the values associated with
unselected alternatives, resulting in better outcomes than the one
obtained, is crucial for regret to occur. Additionally, the emotion
of regret is elicited when the individual feels a personal
responsibility upon the outcome of her/his deliberate choice.
Without these prerequisites, regret would be replaced by the basic
emotion of disappointment.
Evidence that regret and disappointment are mediated by
neural structures only partially overlapping comes from clinical
[11] and brain imaging studies [12], that employed gambling to
assess the neural underpinnings of these emotions. These studies
showed that the experience of regret specifically involves the
activation of the medial orbito frontal cortex (mOFC) [11,12],
ACC and hippocampus [12].
In the present work, we extended the studies on regret by
investigating whether the same cortical areas involved in the first
person experience of regret become active also when the
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 October 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 10 | e7402individual is faced with emotional experiences of regret in others.
Two fMRI studies testing mirror-like responses to regret were
carried out. In both studies, participants chose one of two gambles
resulting in real wins or losses, like in previous investigations
[11,12]. Unlike previous works, though, in the present studies the
participants also observed the same sequence of events (gambles
evaluation, decision, outcome evaluation), this time experienced
by another individual (see Figure 1).
As noted above, regret results from a sense of responsibility.
Therefore, to address specifically regret, as opposed to disappoint-
ment, in two control conditions a computer program randomly
chose one of the gambles for the participant or for the other
player. In these instances, the computer choices still resulted in real
monetary gains or losses for the players but, given the participants’
lack of responsibility upon the gamble selection, the game outcome
did not result in the feeling of regret [12].
The main difference between the two studies lies in the nature of
the participants’ task when presented with the outcomes obtained.
In the first study, we ensured that the participants’ emotional
reaction to the results of the gambles was consistent with the actual
counterfactual comparison between the obtained and unobtained
outcomes (i.e., satisfied or unsatisfied with the outcome). In this
way, we could also assess the participants’ understanding of the
other players’ emotional state at outcome evaluation during
‘‘Other Plays’’ condition. More precisely, the participants were
asked to indicate, after each trial, whether they were satisfied with
their own decision (‘‘I Play’’ condition) or whether, in their
opinion, the other player was satisfied with her/his decision
(‘‘Other Plays’’ condition). Although this response was necessary to
unfold the participants’ emotional coherence with the actual
outcomes in both IP and OP tasks, this type of judgment, by its
nature, is likely to prompt an emotional response in the beholder.
Since one requirement for a mirror response is its automaticity, to
make sure that the observed activations were not affected by the
explicit emotional appraisal of the gamble results, in the second
study participants were required to give a non-emotional
evaluation of the outcomes indicating whether results represented
a win or loss.
Finally, to shed light on the question of whether the engagement
of a resonance mechanism when attending someone else’s
experience of regret is affected by the individuals’ empathic
aptitude, we compared brain activations of females and males,
under the assumption that females are more empathic than males
[13].
Results
Study 1
The reported activations are based on the contrasts between the
conditions where the players (the participant or the actor) made
the decision versus the control conditions (IP minus IF; OP minus
OF). These contrasts aimed at controlling for activations merely
related to the carrying out of the tasks (e.g. visual, motor, etc.) and
to highlight those underlying regret, i.e. outcome evaluation when
one was responsible for her/his own choices. Behavioral measures
confirmed that participants paid attention to the outcomes of all
experimental conditions (see Text S1 for details).
In line with previous works on the neural correlates of regret
processing [12], a parametric analysis was carried out to highlight
the regions showing a positive linear relationship between regional
signal change and the objective amount of regret in the condition
‘‘IP minus IF’’ or ‘‘OP minus OF’’. Additionally, to investigate the
possible involvement of a resonance-mapping system for regret, we
focused on the common parametric effects across tasks, that is on the
cerebral regions activated both when experiencing regret (IP minus
IF) and when being aware of regret experienced by someone else
(OP minus OF) (see Tables S1–S3 and Figure S1 for the description
of the activated foci in the IP and OP tasks separately, as well as in
the formal direct comparisons between them).
The conjunction analysis between IP and OP statistical maps
(relative to IF and OF, respectively; p,0.001 uncorrected)
revealed significant common parametric activations in the left
Figure 1. Experimental conditions, Studies 1 and 2. From left to right, schematic depiction of the sequence of events in the conditions IP (‘‘I
play’’, top) and OP (‘‘Other plays’’, bottom). Within each condition there are 5 phases: instruction, evaluation of the wheels, choice of the gamble,
outcome evaluation and judgment of the outcome. In the depicted example, the participant chose the loosing wheel. The length in seconds of each
sub-event in the two studies is shown, in the inferior-most part of the figure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007402.g001
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bilaterally in the hippocampus (Table 1, Figure 2a). Common
parametric activations were also observed in the dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), and in a cluster extending from the
supplementary motor area (SMA) to the middle cingulate cortex,
as well as in the right middle temporal gyrus.
To make sure that these results did not only reflect an emotional
response to a negative outcome per se, in a separate analysis we
investigated the regions where activity was related to disappointment
(i.e., win or loss in the chosen gamble, independent of the outcome
of the unselected one). Common parametric activations to IP and
OP tasks were observed in a number of areas including the left
postcentral gyrus, the parahippocampal gyrus bilaterally, thalamus
and brainstem periaqueductal grey matter (Table 2, Figure 3) but,
crucially, in neither vmPFC nor ACC.
Study 2
Like in study 1, here we carried out a conjunction analysis of the
parametric effects observed between IP (minus IF) and OP (minus
OF) conditions. This analysis confirmed the results of study 1, in
that mirror-like effects were found in the left ventromedial PFC
and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (Table 3, Figure 2b). As far as
hippocampal activation is concerned, in study 2 we found a
stronger activation in the right hemisphere, as opposed to an
enhanced activation observed in the left hemisphere in study 1.
However, these results are not in conflict since, as it can be
observed from Figure S1, a parametric effect of regret was
observed in the right hippocampus in both IP and OP conditions
also in study 1, though the respective foci did not overlap. Finally,
a few differences were observed with respect to study 1, the most
notable being a lack of activation of the left amygdala.
Individual Empathy-Scores and Gender Effects
During a post-scanning session, participants had to complete an
Italian translation [14] of the Balanced-Emotional-Empathy-Scale
(BEES; [15]), a test assessing emotional empathy.
Behavioral data from the BEES showed that the mean scores for
our participants in study 1 were 34.83 (s.d.=16.75) for females
and 19.33 (s.d.=18.39) for males. These data were representative
of the normal Italian population (female mean=37, s.d.=18;
male mean=21, s.d.=18; [14]) and revealed a significant gender
difference, females being more empathic than males (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for normality: d=0.091, p.0.2; two-sample t-test,
N=24, t(22)=2.15, p=0.042).
Consistent with these results, direct gender comparisons carried
out in the parametric statistical maps of the third-person task (OP
minus OF) revealed stronger activations for females than males in
the ventromedial PFC, in ACC and in portions of the parietal
cortex bilaterally, including the somatosensory cortex and the
inferior parietal lobule (Table 4, Figure 4a).
These findings were confirmed in OP condition (minus OF) of
study 2, where enhanced activations for females with respect to
males were observed in the ventromedial PFC and somatosensory
cortex bilaterally (Table 5, Figure 4b). However, unlike study 1, an
enhanced activation for females was also observed in the anterior
insula bilaterally (Figure 4b). This result can be interpreted in
relation to the behavioral scores obtained on the BEES in study 2,
that not only showed a higher mean difference between females
and males than that observed in study 1, but also higher scores for
females with respect to those obtained by their peers from study 1
(females’ mean =53.83, s.d. =11.37; males’ mean =23.08,
s.d.=27.11; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality: d=0.19,
p.0.2; two-sample t-test, N=24, t(22)=3.62, p=0.007).
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether the
understanding of complex emotions, like regret, in others involves
the reactivation of the cerebral areas associated with the observer’s
direct emotional experience. Regret is a negative emotion arising
from a counterfactual comparison between the outcome of chosen
and discarded options, whereby the discarded option would have
producedhigherbenefitsto the individual[10].Regret thus requires
two conditions to occur: namely, the feeling of responsibility for the
decision made and a post-decisional evaluation of possible
unselected alternatives associated with better outcomes than the
one obtained. These two conditions define the emotional and
cognitive differences underpinning regret with respect to other
negative emotions like disappointment for a loss [12].
In this study we controlled for the effect of regret on cerebral
activity by means of methodological and statistical measures.
Methodologically, we dealt with the players’ feeling of responsi-
bility by comparing the conditions in which the participants
actively made a deliberate choice (IP, OP) with control conditions
in which choices were randomly made by the computer (IF, OF).
Statistically, we used a parametric analysis to investigate only those
areas whose activity showed a positive relation with increasing
levels of regret. Specifically, we modeled the difference between
the outcome of the chosen and unchosen gambles, so that also
positive outcomes could result in regret if compared to an even
more positive unselected outcome. Violation to these assumptions
(feeling of the responsibility and counterfactual evaluation) lead to
another emotional state, namely disappointment, even when faced
with the same amount of loss.
The neural correlates of regret processing have been previously
investigated using fMRI. These studies, carried out on healthy
Table 1. Study 1, parametric analysis of regret: conjunction IP
and OP conditions.
H Anatomical region (BA) MNI Z-score
xy z
IP (minus IF) and OP (minus OF)
L vmPFC (11) 214 46 214 3.62
L Anterior cingulate cortex (24/32) 28 38 12 3.31
R Anterior cingulate cortex (24/32) 2 38 12 3.32
LS M A ( 6 ) 0 28 58 3.28
L/R SMA (6) 4 214 52 3.39
R Middle cingulate cortex (6) 24 26 48 3.34
R Middle temporal gyrus (21) 58 210 218 3.40
L Amygdala 214 22 218 3.26
L Temporal pole (38) 228 4 220 3.47
Amygdala 224 0 220 3.32
L Hippocampus 232 234 212 3.61
R Hippocampus 32 210 232 3.53
Activations linearly and positively related to the objective amount of regret
(measured as the difference between the actual outcome and the outcome of
the unchosen gamble) in both the IP (minus IF) and OP (minus OF) conditions in
study 1 (p,0.001 uncorrected). H=Hemisphere, L=Left, R=Right,
BA=estimated Brodmann Area, vmPFC=ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex,
SMA=Supplementary Motor Area.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007402.t001
Mirroring Regret
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 October 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 10 | e7402Figure 2. Common parametric effects of regret in Studies 1 and 2. Activations linearly and positively related to the objective amount of regret
(measured as the difference between the outcomes of the chosen and unchosen gambles) in both the IP (minus IF) and OP (minus OF) conditions in
Studies 1 and 2 (Conjunction analysis; p,0.001 uncorrected). a) Study 1: representative sections from the MNI305 template brain. From left to right:
sagittal section showing activations in supplementary motor area (SMA), middle cingulate cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC); horizontal
section showing activations in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and hippocampus (HIP); horizontal section showing left amygdala and right
middle temporal gyrus activations. b) Study 1: from left to right, percent BOLD signal change (4 mm-radius sphere centered on the local maxima) in
the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and Hippocampus (HIP) is shown for both ‘‘I Play’’ (IP, yellow) and ‘‘Other
Plays’’ (OP, blue) conditions. c) Study 2: representative sections from the MNI305 template brain. From left to right: sagittal section showing
activations in middle cingulate cortex and ACC; horizontal section showing activations in vmPFC and HIP; coronal section showing right HIP
activation. d) Study 2: from left to right, percent BOLD signal change in the same areas as in b).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007402.g002
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present experiments, showed that the experience of regret is
associated with the activation of OFC alongside structures
involved in cognitively-induced responses to aversive and painful
stimuli (ACC), and in declarative memory (hippocampal regions)
[12] (see also [11] below).
What distinguishes the present study from the previous ones is a
specific focus to the understanding of the experience of regret
when observing someone else experiencing it, i.e. a resonance
mirror effect that, to date, has been investigated only with basic-
level emotional stimuli. Among the studies addressing mirroring in
the emotional system, of particular interest is the fMRI study by
Singer et al. [7], where volunteers either experienced a painful
stimulus or observed a cue indicating that their loved one, present
in the same room, was receiving a similar stimulation. The areas
that were activated both when the volunteers were experiencing
pain and when they knew that the other individual was
experiencing it, were the anterior insula bilaterally and the
ACC. Similar results were reported also for disgust. As for pain,
feeling disgust or observing someone expressing it activates the
anterior insula and the ACC [5].
In line with these studies [5,7] (see also [16,17] and [6] for a
review), we focused on the common effects observed in the
cerebral regions that were activated both when experiencing regret
(IP minus IF) and when observing the regretful outcome of another
player (OP minus OF).
Our data on the parametric effects common to IP and OP tasks
(relative to baseline) in both studies 1 and 2 revealed several
activation foci including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and hippocampus (Tables 1
and 3, Figure 2). These results confirm previous findings [12,18]
and, crucially, show that the activation of these regions also occurs
when participants observe the other player’s regretful outcomes. It
is worth noting that the results from study 1 revealed a modulation
of activity also in the amygdala that was not confirmed in our
second study. In this respect, it is likely that, in study 1, amygdala
activation was enhanced by the emotional nature of the judgment
provided by the participants, and lack of activation in study 2
shows that modulation of its activity is not specific for regret. This
lack of emotion-specificity is in contrast with vmPFC activation
that, on the other hand, is core to the expression of regret.
Largely on the basis of evidence coming from animal studies,
the medial portion of ventral prefrontal cortex is thought to be
associated with positive reward processing, as opposed to its lateral
part that instead is supposed to be involved in the processing of
negative stimulus valence [19]. However, several studies have
highlighted a more complex picture, according to which the
medial portion of ventral prefrontal cortex is engaged in the
processing of both positive and negative emotional events [20].
What the present and previous works strongly suggest, however, is
that not all types of emotion are associated with vmPFC activation;
rather there seems to be a specific involvement of this area in the
processing of complex emotions. A convincing evidence in this
respect comes from clinical studies, showing that patients with
medial PFC lesions that performed a gambling task similar to that
Table 2. Study 1, parametric analysis of disappointment:
conjunction IP and OP conditions.
H Anatomical region (BA) MNI Z-score
xy z
IP (minus IF) and OP (minus OF)
L Postcentral gyrus (2) 246 230 42 3.20
R Hippocampus 14 228 210 4.18
R Hippocampus 26 216 218 3.33
L Parahippocampal gyrus 218 222 218 4.07
L/R Thalamus/periacqueductal grey matter 0 224 10 4.13
L/R Cerebellum vermis 3 22 236 2 4.66
R Cerebellum (VI) 30 244 226 3.67
L/R Brainstem 26 220 226 3.99
Activations linearly and positively related to the objective amount of
disappointment (measured as the difference between the obtained and
unobtained outcomes of the chosen gamble) in both the IP (minus IF) and OP
(minus OF) conditions in study 1 (p,0.001 uncorrected). H=Hemisphere,
L=Left, R=Right, BA=estimated Brodmann Area.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007402.t002
Figure 3. Common parametric effects of disappointment in Study 1. Shared effect of the parametric amount of disappointment (measured
as the difference between the actual and unobtained outcome of the chosen gamble) across IP (minus IF) and OP (minus OF) conditions in Study 1, as
shown by the results of a conjunction-analysis (p,0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007402.g003
Mirroring Regret
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elicited by the counterfactual comparison between the selected
outcome and those of unselected alternatives [11]. Notably,
however, those patients could exhibit emotional arousal to a loss
when the observation of post-decisional outcome did not induce
any counterfactual reasoning, i.e. disappointment.
These results confirm the view that vmPFC defines the emotional
value of the error given by the difference between the obtained
outcome and the unselected alternatives that, if chosen, would have
produced better results. This error, which emotionally results in the
negative feeling of regret, is a necessary drive for behavioral
reorganization. Anterior cingulate cortex uses information about
the emotional valenceof unsuccessful behavior to re-organize future
choices accordingly [21]. In other words, the negative emotion
associated with regret is the basis of the motivation to workout
alternative solutionsinresponsetothereoccurrenceoffuturesimilar
situations. This motivation lacks in disappointment, where the
individual has no feeling of responsibility upon the outcome and is
powerless with respect to her/his loss.
Core of this study are the common effects observed between the
conditions IP and OP (after baseline subtraction), which indicate
that vmPFC-ACC and hippocampal activations mediate the
processing of regret not only when directly experienced, but also
when knowing that someone else is facing a counterfactual
negative outcome. More specifically, this finding shows that the
understanding of others’ regret is mediated by the reactivation of
the same core cerebral regions that induce the feeling of regret in
the beholder during a first person experience, hence supporting
the involvement of a resonance, mirror-like, mechanism in the
comprehension of the high-order emotion of regret when
experienced by others. Through this mechanism, others’ emo-
tional states are mapped onto the same areas that underlie ones’
own direct experiences, therefore allowing an automatic under-
Table 3. Study 2, parametric analysis of regret: conjunction IP
and OP conditions.
H Anatomical region (BA) MNI Z-score
xy z
IP (minus IF) and OP (minus OF)
L vmPFC (11/10) 210 42 210 4.26
L Lateral OFC/anterior insula (11/38) 226 16 220 3.98
L Anterior cingulate cortex (24/32) 214 34 14 3.28
R Middle cingulate cortex (24) 12 4 22 3.93
R Middle frontal gyrus (46) 46 44 18 3.80
Inferior frontal gyrus (45) 50 40 16 3.58
R Amygdala 28 212 212 3.28
Hippocampus 34 220 214 3.36
R Dorsal striatum 12 14 8 3.64
Activations linearly and positively related to the objective amount of regret in
both the IP (minus IF) and OP (minus OF) conditions in study 2 (p,0.001
uncorrected). H=Hemisphere, L=Left, R=Right, BA=estimated Brodmann
Area, vmPFC=ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, OFC=OrbitoFrontal Cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007402.t003
Table 4. Study 1, parametric analysis of regret: direct gender-
comparisons in OP condition.
H Anatomical region (BA) MNI Z-score
xyz
a. OP minus OF: Females.Males
L vmPFC (11) 244 0 28 4.36
Anterior cingulate cortex (11/32) 212 42 14 3.43
L Supramarginal gyrus (2/40) 256 234 36 5.18
Inferior parietal lobule (2) 256 230 42 4.08
R Postcentral gyrus (2/1) 44 240 58 4.55
Inferior parietal lobule (2) 54 240 56 3.93
b. OP minus OF: Males.Females
L Hippocampus 240 218 216 4.75
L Hippocampus 228 214 232 3.86
R Hippocampus 40 222 212 4.63
R Hippocampus 30 212 226 5.02
Cerebral regions showing significant gender-effects related to the objective
amount of attended regret in the OP (minus OF) condition in study 1 (p,0.001
uncorrected). H=Hemisphere, L=Left, R=Right, BA=estimated Brodmann
Area, vmPFC=ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007402.t004
Figure 4. Differential parametric effects of gender on attended
regret in the ‘‘Other Plays’’ (OP) condition. The different linear
parametric effect of regret for female vs. male participants in Studies 1
(a) and 2 (b) (thresholded at p,0.001 uncorrected) in the OP (minus
OF) condition are shown on 3D-renderings and representative slices of
the MNI305 template brain.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007402.g004
Mirroring Regret
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emotion of regret in others.
So far, there was only behavioral evidence to suggest that the
mere observation of a negative situation occurring to another
individual evokes in the observer the same mental processes as
those of the acting individual. These investigations assessed
counterfactual reasoning in social contexts by comparing reported
mental simulations of actors, readers and observers of different
situations all resolving negatively [8,9]. These studies showed that
actors (who made a decision and obtained a negative outcome)
and readers (who read a story describing the actor’s choice and
outcome) produce different counterfactuals by focusing attention
on different aspects of the situation [8]. However, when comparing
actors’ and observers’ counterfactuals, these studies show that
observers (who directly observed the actors’ negative resolving
situations) tend to mentally simulate alternative post-decisional
solutions to those situations as actors themselves do [9]. These
results suggest that, when faced with the negative outcome of
another person’s choices, individuals tend to react as they were
personally involved in that situation.
Attending another’s negative emotion, however, is a complex
phenomenon that can elicit different and conflicting reactions in the
beholder,asshown bytworecentstudies that have highlighted some
oftheseveralfacetsrelatedtotheunderstandingofothers’emotions.
These studies have addressed individuals’ emotional responses
arising from direct social comparisons [22,23]. In Takahashi et al. [22],
experimental contexts were defined a priori so as to elicit in the
participants either the emotion of envy or gloating (schadenfreude).
fMRI technique allowed to associate these emotions to the
activation of dorsal ACC (envy) and of ventral striatum plus medial
OFC (gloating), supporting the view that OFC activation is not
specific for the processing of negative emotions. Bault et al., [23], on
theotherhand,assessedtheeffectsofone’sownand others’previous
outcomes on choice behavior in a gambling task. The authors
observed that, when individuals played simultaneously on the same
trials, the emotional (as assessed trough skin conductance response
and heart-rate recording) and behavioral effects of envy and
gloating (when the players made different choices) are stronger than
the effects of regret and relief (when they made the same choices). In
other words, these data show that, in a direct social confrontation,
individuals’ choice behavior is more strongly affected by the feelings
of envy and gloating than by the emotions of regret or relief.
At a first glance, based on data from both these investigations,
one might argue that the neural activations observed in the present
study during ‘‘Other Plays’’ condition could relate to the emotion
of gloating for the other player’s misfortunes, rather than to regret.
However, several considerations speak against this interpretation.
Firstly, those studies were constructed so to elicit direct social
comparisons between individuals by either manipulating partici-
pants’ specific information or by having individuals playing on
same trials. In the present study, the effect of possible social
comparisons on the reported results was minimized. In fact,
participants played on different trials and, particularly in study 1,
the OP trials occurred immediately after the IP ones (direct social
comparison) statistically only in 1 out of 32 trials. Additionally,
outcomes producing the feelings of regret and relief were
counterbalanced, thus further reducing the effect of gloating also
when OP trials directly followed IP ones. Moreover, evidence that
our results are not spoilt by the effects of gloating is represented by
a lack of activation of the ventral striatum in OP task, which
Takahashi et al. [22] indicate as its neural signature. Nonetheless,
we do not reject the idea of possible different emotions, than
regret, ultimately arising from the individual’s awareness of
someone else’s regret. Still, our data clearly show that, in given
contextual frames, e.g. when direct social comparison is mini-
mized, and when individuals are aware of the process that leads to
regret in others, observers neurally respond as they were directly
involved in that situation. This neural process allows one to
cognitively and emotionally reproduce the feeling experienced by
a third person, thus leading to its automatic understanding.
A critical factor in the level of an individual’s shared experience is
her/his empathic aptitude. In this study, the behavioral results
obtained on the BEES showed higher scores for females than
males, particularly in study 2, suggesting that higher emphatic
aptitude is associated with enhanced activation observed for
females in vmPFC (see also [24]) and, only in study 2, in anterior
insula (see Tables 4 and 5, Figure 4). Enhanced vmPFC activation
for females during OP condition suggests that the engagement of
the ‘‘resonant’’ mechanism in the regret network is particularly
strong in emphatic individuals; insular activation, on the other
hand, appears to be not related to regret per se, rather it can be
more generally associated with the processing of emotional
empathic responses, as also shown in previous studies [5,7,17].
On the whole, our data suggest that the emotional understand-
ing of regret in others is specifically reflected by the activation of a
subset of the regions involved in its direct, first-person, experience.
Among these regions, vmPFC appears to be at the core of a
counterfactual evaluation of the outcomes, updating the emotional
valence of the obtained outcome with respect to that unobtained
[12]. This evaluation results in the appropriate behavioral
response associated with activity in ACC even when attending
another’s negative results. The finding of a resonance mapping
system for the high-order experience of regret entails an important
notion. In real social decisional contexts, one’s own decisions and
behaviors may be strongly influenced by interactive learning, i.e.,
learning from what other individuals experience as a result of their
choices [25]. One might then wonder how such learning occurs,
Table 5. Study 2, parametric analysis of regret: direct gender-
comparisons in OP condition.
H Anatomical region (BA) MNI Z-score
xy z
a. OP minus OF: Females.Males
L/R ACC/vmPFC (10/11) 26 48 0 3.57
L Medial OFC (11) 210 54 214 3.36
L Anterior insula/IFG pars orbitalis (47) 234 28 24 3.69
R Anterior insula/IFG pars orbitalis (47) 42 28 22 3.36
L SMA/Middle cingulate cortex (6) 214 222 52 3.53
L Postcentral gyrus (3b) 218 240 58 3.42
R Sensorimotor cortex (4a/1) 40 214 52 3.41
b. OP minus OF: Males.Females
L/R Middle cingulate cortex (23) 28 14 28 3.96
L/R Superior medial gyrus (9) 24 52 36 3.34
Cerebral regions showing significant gender-effects related to the objective
amount of attended regret in the OP (minus OF) condition in study 2 (p,0.001
uncorrected). H=Hemisphere, L=Left, R=Right, BA=estimated Brodmann
Area, ACC=Anterior Cingulate Cortex, vmPFC=ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex,
OFC=OrbitoFrontal Cortex, IFG=Inferior frontal gyrus, SMA=Supplementary
Motor Area.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007402.t005
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coded in the decision-maker’s brain. Does such a process involve
the mere cold encoding of numerical quantities? The results of the
present study show that this is not entirely the case. Rather,
knowing the regretful outcomes of others’ choices do lead to
similar counterfactual comparisons and, via the reactivation of the
same underlying cerebral regions, to the comprehension of the
related emotional reactions, as experienced in a first-person
perspective. This resonant emotion may represent a drive for
behavioral reorganization even when attended in somebody else’s
experiences.
Materials and Methods
Study 1
Participants. Twenty-four healthy right-handed [26]
monolingual native speakers of Italian (12 females [mean
age=25.75, s.d.=2.18, range=23.5–31.8] and 12 males [mean
age=25.34, s.d.=2.90, range=22–29.7]) participated in study 1.
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
None reported a history of psychiatric or neurological disorders, or
current use of any psychoactive medications. They gave their
written informed consent to the experimental procedure, which
was approved by the Ethics Committee of San Raffaele Scientific
Institute.
Task. The participants performed a classical gambling task
[27]. In every trial, they were required to choose one of two
gambles depicted as ‘‘wheels of fortune’’, in which different
probabilities of financial gain or loss are represented by the relative
size of colored sectors of a circle. The gambles were then played
and the results shown. Participants could thus evaluate not only
the financial consequences of their decision, but also the outcome
they might have obtained had they selected the alternative gamble.
These evaluations gave them a sense of responsibility for their
choices and determined a counterfactual reasoning, i.e., the main
hallmarks of regret, when decisions produce relatively-negative
outcome.
In the present investigation, there were two basic experimental
conditions (see Figure 1). In the ‘‘I play’’ (IP) condition, participants
were asked to choose one of two gambles, leading to a financial
gain or loss for themselves. The gambles were shown for 5 s,
during which they could evaluate them and make a decision. Next,
the appearance of an asterisk in the centre of the screen prompted
the participants to choose, by pressing one of two buttons on a
keyboard with their right index or middle finger. The participants
had 2 s to choose the gamble. In case they did not answer within
this temporal window, they received an ‘‘out of time’’ message,
and a new trial started. Once selected, the chosen gamble was
highlighted by a white contour, and 3 s after the appearance of the
asterisk the outcome of both gambles was shown for 3 s. In the
‘‘Other plays’’ (OP) condition, the participants were shown the same
sequence of events (evaluation, decision and outcome, with the
same timings) of the gamble played by an actor in a nearby room.
In the OP condition, a small white square was shown along with
the asterisk, either on its left or right side. The asterisk position
indicated which gamble had just been chosen by the actor, and
participants were asked to press the corresponding button. In
order to focus their attention on the gamble-results in both IP and
OP conditions, and to assess the participants’ understanding of the
other players’ emotional state at outcome evaluation, after
outcome presentation the participants had to indicate whether
they were satisfied with their own result (IP) or whether the actor
was satisfied with her result (OP), by pressing one of two buttons
(left: yes, right: no; 3 s).
As an explicit-baseline, two further conditions were used: in the
‘‘I follow’’ (IF) and ‘‘Other follows’’ (OF) conditions, participants were
informed that the computer would randomly choose one of the
gambles, for themselves or for the other player, respectively. In
these conditions, the decision-period lasted 2 s. Like in the OP
condition, the decision made by the computer was signaled by a
small white square appearing along with the asterisk, and
participants were simply asked to press the corresponding left/
right button. These trials still resulted in financial gains or losses
for the participants or the actor, yet enabled us to control for the
feeling of responsibility for the gamble choice, which is a crucial
determinant of the emotion of regret.
Each trial started with a specific instruction indicating the
condition type (1 s), which remained at the bottom of the screen
throughout the trial length. All instructions were presented in
Italian.
Gambles structure. The participants underwent a total of
256 trials (64 for each experimental condition). The complete list
of trials was predetermined and identical for all the participants. In
each gamble, the 4 possible outcomes resulted from paired
combinations of 200, 50, 250 and 2200 (arbitrary units),
associated with 8 different levels of probability (30-70, 35-65, 40-
60, 45-55, 55-45, 60-40, 65-35, 70-30). Thus, the possible
combinations of wins and losses gave four potential levels of
regret (2100, 2150, 2250 and 2400) and relief (100, 150, 250
and 400). The possible combinations of payoffs and levels of
probability were equally balanced across all experimental
conditions. In each trial, payoffs and probabilities were
associated so that a) one of the gambles was riskier than the
other, and b) the difference between the gambles was minimized
with regard to the expected-value (i.e., the sum of the probability
of the two possible gamble outcomes, each multiplied by the
corresponding outcome value). In order to compare the effects of
different experienced vs. attended amounts of regret, it was crucial
to outbalance the number of events of interest across the different
experimental conditions. Therefore, unbeknownst to the
participants, the list of stimuli was arranged so that in OP, IF
and OF conditions every single trial resulted in a pre-determined
pair of outcomes (and thus in a pre-specified amount of either
regret or relief in the OP condition). In order to make sure that the
number of regret and relief events balanced out in the IP task
(where we had no control on the participant’s choice), every trial
was pre-determined to necessarily result in a variable amount of
either regret or relief by means of a feedback-routine. For every
task, the obtained ‘‘regret’’ and ‘‘relief’’ trials were then assigned to
the different functional runs so to obtain a variable proportion of
events of regret and relief. Crucially, to preserve a most realistic
probabilistic scenario, in all conditions we ensured that, across
trials, the least probable gamble outcomes would occur in a
proportion equal or inferior to 50% (OP=47%; IF and
OF=50%; IP=42%). In fact, as confirmed by the post-
scanning debriefing, all participants were unaware of the
experimental control on the probabilistic occurrence of wins and
losses.
Instructions and procedure. The participants underwent a
training session and were introduced to the same unknown female
actor before the beginning of the study. Moreover, they were
informed that both their and the actor’s performance in IP/IF and
OP/OF tasks, respectively, would have resulted in a financial gain
or loss with respect to an initial endowment. Importantly, to
constrain a competitive attitude towards the actor’s performance,
participants were explicitly informed that their potential gains/
losses were completely independent of those of the other player.
Additionally, when introducing the actor to the participants, the
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participants were informed about their cumulative earnings only
outside the scanner, after the functional acquisition.
The study was composed of 8 functional runs. Every run
comprised 32 trials (8 for each experimental condition). These
were randomly assigned to 8 blocks, each of which contained 4
consecutive trials of the same condition. The order of the
functional runs, of the blocks within each run and of the trials
within each block were randomized across participants. Null
events were also included in every run, to allow estimation of low-
level baseline brain activity. In order to desynchronize the timings
of event-types with respect to the acquisition of single slices within
functional volumes, interstimulus intervals (ISI) between successive
trials were presented in different (‘‘jittered’’) durations across trials
(1350, 1950, and 2550 s, in proportion of 4:2:1; [28]).
Visual stimuli were viewed via a back-projection screen located
in front of the scanner and a mirror placed on the head-coil. The
software Presentation 11.0 (Neurobehavioral systems, Albany, CA,
http://www.neurobs.com) was used both for stimulus presentation
and participants’ answers recording.
After the scanning, participants were asked to report their
personal impressions about the task. Then, they completed an
Italian version [14] of the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale
(BEES; [15]), a 30-item questionnaire on emphatic abilities
designed to measure individual tendency to empathize with
others’ emotional experiences (i.e., emotional empathy).
Study 2: Differences with respect to study 1
Participants. Twenty-four healthy right-handed [26]
monolingual native speakers of Italian (12 females [mean
age=20.28, s.d.=1.16, range=19–23] and 12 males [mean
age=22.86, s.d.=3.26, range=19–30]) participated in study 2.
Task. Three main differences distinguished study 2 from
study 1 with regard to the task. Firstly, the emotional component
of post-outcome judgment was replaced by a ‘‘cold’’ appraisal of
the obtained outcome. Namely, instead of providing a satisfaction-
judgment, the participants were required to indicate whether the
gamble outcome was a win or a loss. Second, in study 2
participants’ response was required in all four conditions (IP, OP,
IF, OF) and only on 10% of the trials. Finally, the length of the
evaluation phase (gambles presentation) was identical in all four
conditions (4.5 s).
Gambles structure. Different from study 1, in each gamble
the 4 possible outcomes resulted from paired combinations of 200,
50, 250 and 2200 (arbitrary units), associated with only 3
different levels of probability (25-75, 50-50, 75-25). However, the
possible combinations of wins and losses still gave four potential
levels of regret (2100, 2150, 2250 and 2400) and relief (100,
150, 250 and 400).
Instructions and procedure. All participants underwent a
training session, and were introduced to an unknown actor. In
study 2, half of them (50% females and 50% males) were presented
to a female actor and the other half to a male actor.
fMRI data acquisition and statistical analysis.
Anatomical T1-weighted and functional T2*-weighted MR images
were acquired with a 3 Tesla Philips Achieva scanner (Philips
Medical Systems, Best, NL), using an 8-channels Sense head coil
(sense reduction factor=2). Functional images wereacquired using a
T2*-weighted gradient-echo, echo-planar (EPI) pulse sequence (38
interleaved coronal slices covering the whole brain, TR=2200 ms,
TE=30 ms, flip-angle=85 degrees, FOV=240 mm6240 mm,
inter-slice gap=0.5 mm, slice thickness=4 mm, in-plane
resolution 2.5 mm62.5 mm). Each scanning sequence comprised
215 sequential volumes. Immediately after the functional scanning a
high-resolution T1-weighted anatomical scan (150 slices,
TR=600 ms, TE=20 ms, slice thickness=1 mm, in-plane
resolution 1 mm61 mm) was acquired for each participants.
Image pre-processing and statistical analysis were performed
using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology,
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm), implemented in Matlab v7.4
(Mathworks, Inc., Sherborn, MA) [29]. The first 5 volumes of each
participant were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. All
volumes were then spatially realigned [30] to the first volume of
the first session to correct for between-scan motion and unwarped
[31], and a mean-image from the realigned volumes was created.
This image was spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological
Institute 305 (MNI305) brain template using a 12-parameter affine
normalization and 16 nonlinear iterations with 76967 basis
functions [32]. The derived spatial transformations were then
applied to the realigned-and-unwarped T2*-weighted volumes,
that were resampled in 26262-mm voxels after normalization. All
functional volumes were then spatially smoothed with an 8-mm
full-width half-maximum (FWHM) isotropic Gaussian kernel to
compensate for residual between-subject variability after spatial
normalization, and globally scaled to 100. The resulting time series
across each voxel were then high-pass filtered to 1/128 Hz, and
serial autocorrelations were modeled as an Auto-Regressive AR(1)
process.
Statistical maps were generated using a random-effect model,
implemented in a 2-levels procedure [33].
At the first level, two sets of analyses were performed. Firstly,
outcome trials were partitioned according to the 4 conditions (IP,
IF, OP, OF) which were separately modeled as mini-epoch lasting
3 s. For each of the 4 conditions, one additional regressor modeled
a linear parametric modulation of the outcome-related activity by
the degree of objective amount of regret/relief (computed as the
difference between the actual and unobtained outcomes). In line
with Coricelli et al.’s [12] procedure , in a second analysis we
modeled a linear parametric modulation by the degree of
satisfaction/disappointment, i.e., the amount of discrepancy between
the obtained and unobtained outcomes in the chosen gamble only.
All the within-trials events other than the outcomes, as well as
those trials in which a wrong response or no response was given,
were modeled in a single regressor of no interest. Regressors
modeling events were convolved with a canonical Haemodynamic
Response Function (HRF), and parameter estimates for all
regressors were obtained at each voxel by maximum-likelihood
estimation. Contrasts of parameter estimates were then calculated
to produce ‘‘contrast images’’ for each contrast of interest (‘‘IP
minus IF’’ and ‘‘OP minus OF’’ for both regret- and disappoint-
ment-related parametric regressors).
At the second (group) level, these two types of contrast-image
were used to perform separate parametric (i.e., dependent on the
degree of either regret or disappointment) analyses. Furthermore,
since we aimed at investigating also potential gender effects on
‘‘mirror-like’’ cerebral activity, the 1
st-level contrast images for ‘‘IP
minus IF’’ and ‘‘OP minus OF’’ for male and female participants
were entered into a 262 [perspective (‘‘IP vs. OP’’) by gender
(female vs. male)] factorial design with sphericity-correction for
repeated measures [34]. Based on a-priori hypotheses from a
previous study [12], the resulting statistical maps were thresholded
at p,0.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons, and only
clusters larger than 5 voxels were reported.
In order to assess common effects across IP and OP tasks, we
carried out a conjunction analysis on the IP (minus IF) and OP (minus
OF) statistical maps for both the disappointment- and the regret-
related parametric effects. This analysis was done using an inclusive
masking procedure, in which the statistical maps for OP conditions
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comparisons were performed to assess perspective- and gender-
effects on condition-related cerebral activity in both analyses. The
resulting statistical maps were thresholded at p,0.001 uncorrected
for multiple comparisons and, in order to ensure that the observed
activations did not result from relative deactivations, they were
inclusively masked at p,0.05 uncorrected by those associated with
the conditions of interest minus the baseline task.
The location of the activation foci in terms of Brodmann Areas
(BAs) was determined in the stereotaxic space of Talairach and
Tournoux [35] after correcting for differences between the latter
and the MNI coordinate systems by means of a nonlinear
transformation (see http://www.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/Imaging/
Common/mnispace.shtml). Those cerebral regions for which
maps are provided were also localized with reference to
cytoarchitectonical probabilistic maps of the human brain, using
the SPM-Anatomy toolbox [36].
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